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Abstract
In this dissertation thesis we study todays most popular and widely used public-key
cryptosystem: the RSA-cryptosystem, which was proposed in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and
Adleman. We show that some choices of the RSA-parameters lead to polynomial time
attacks on the cryptosystem.
Let us have a closer look at the parameter generation process in RSA: One chooses
two large prime numbers p and q and computes their product N = pq. The so-called RSA
modul N is public, whereas the factorization of N is kept secret. Furthermore, one chooses
a key-pair (e, d) satisfying ed = 1 mod (p − 1)(q − 1). The parameter e is public and the
parameter d is secret.
One can easily compute the secret key d from the public information (N, e) if the
factorization of N is known. Therefore, an attacker can try to compute the factorization of
N . But up to now no algorithm is known that factors N in time polynomial in the bit-size
of N .
In this work, we show that an attacker can determine the factorization of N in poly-
nomial time, provided that e is of a special form or that the attacker gets into possession
of a fraction of the secret key bits. The main method that we use in order to achieve our
results is a method for finding small solutions of modular polynomial equations, which was
proposed in 1996 by Coppersmith. Our main results in this dissertation thesis are:
◦ Generalization of Coppersmith’s method for univariate polynomials. We also propose
an approach for constructing optimal lattice bases, which are used in Coppersmith’s
method.
◦ Polynomial time factorization of N given (N, e), provided that the corresponding d
is of the form d = d1
d2
mod (p− 1)(q − 1) for small d1, d2.
This result leads to the crytanalysis of an RSA-variant that was proposed in 2001.
◦ Polynomial time factorization of N , provided that the parameter dp = d mod p − 1
is small and that q ≤ N 0.382. Small values of dp are often used in practice since they
speed up the decryption process.
◦ Several polynomial time attacks on RSA, provided that a fraction of the bits of d or
of dp is known. These attacks are also generalized to RSA moduli of the form N = p
rq
for r > 1.
